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393 
BETTING ON THE SAFETY ACT: HOW RELYING ON THIS 
RELATIVELY UNKNOWN STATUTE IN RECENT LITIGATION 
MAY BE A GAMBLE
ALEC KRAUS*
INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 2017, Stephen Paddock fired upon the crowd at the 
Route 91 Harvest Festival in Las Vegas, Nevada, from a thirty-second floor 
window of the Mandalay Bay Resort.1 Paddock’s attack killed fifty-eight 
people and injured around 500 others.2 Following the attack, over 2,500 
individuals brought or threatened to bring lawsuits against MGM Resorts 
International (“MGM”)—the parent company for the Mandalay Bay Resort 
and the owner of the Route 91 Harvest Festival grounds—and MGM’s 
various subsidiaries allegedly involved in the incident, according to 
MGM.3 These lawsuits allege that MGM is liable for the deaths, injuries, 
and emotional distress connected to the Route 91 Harvest Festival inci-
dent.4
MGM then took an aggressive approach in defending these lawsuits, 
suing more than 1,000 of these victims in federal court and seeking a de-
claratory judgment absolving MGM of all tort liability for the Route 91 
Harvest Festival incident.5 In these lawsuits, MGM argued that the Support 
Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 
(“SAFETY Act”)6 bars any liability that MGM had to the victims of the 
incident because MGM contracted with a security company to screen con-
cert-goers, and DHS certified those screening techniques under the 
* J.D. Class of 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
1.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, MGM Resorts Int’l v. Eardley, No. 2:18-cv-00567-
JNP, 2018 WL 3437089 (D. Utah 2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 2–3. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 5. 
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SAFETY Act.7 In 2019, MGM had an approximate total of nine lawsuits in 
eight districts against 1,977 individuals.8
For understandable reasons, some highly criticized MGM’s strategy.9
Victims described the lawsuits as adding insult to injury, showing enor-
mous public disapproval to MGM’s lawsuits.10 And the total number of 
lawsuits filed against MGM was somewhat debated, undermining MGM’s 
justification for its aggressive defense strategy.11 In response, MGM stated 
that these lawsuits will help the community and victims heal faster instead 
of dragging out litigation for years.12
Aside from facing issues of public relations, MGM also faced issues 
with its legal arguments as well. There was much speculation, especially 
given the publicity surrounding the lawsuits, whether the SAFETY Act 
applied in this instance and whether MGM’s claims fit the requirements of 
the SAFETY Act.13 Notably, there is still considerable uncertainty as to the 
SAFETY Act’s provisions because, despite being a significant source of 
tort reform legislation,14 the statute has never been the focus of such litiga-
tion before MGM’s lawsuits.15
The SAFETY Act, a provision of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002,16 protects providers of certain qualified anti-terrorism security tech-
nologies and services—called “sellers”—from tort liability stemming from 
acts of terrorism.17 The Act grants the Secretary of Homeland Security 
 7.  In re Route 91 Harvest Festival Shootings in Las Vegas, Nev., on Oct. 1, 2017, 347 F. Supp. 
3d 1355, 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2018). 
 8.  Id. at 1356–57. 
 9.  For instance, a New York state senator called for MGM to withdraw the lawsuits if MGM 
wanted to purchase a casino in the state. Kenneth Lovett, Exclusive: New York senator calls for MGM 
to drop lawsuit against Las Vegas mass shooting victims if it wants to buy Yonkers casino, NY DAILY 
NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-pol-mgm-mayer-las-vegas-
shooting-mandalay-mayer-casino-20180808-story.html [http://perma.cc/2WBA-9RA5]. 
 10.  Michael Goldstein, Will MGM Resorts Lawsuit Against Shooting Victims Tarnish Its Brand?,
FORBES (July 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelgoldstein/2018/07/27/will-mgm-resorts-
lawsuit-against-shooting-victims-tarnish-its-brand/#789b0007623e [http://perma.cc/9AX7-95WW].
 11.  See In re Route 91 Harvest Festival Shootings, 347 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (noting only 38 
negligence actions have been filed, of which 34 have been voluntarily dismissed).
 12.  Eliot C. McLaughlin, MGM Resorts denies liability for Las Vegas shooting, asks courts for 
protection from lawsuits, CNN (July 19, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/17/us/mgm-lawsuit-
victims-las-vegas-shooting-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/657Z-MXUX]. 
 13.  See Jackie Valley, Liability and an obscure law: Will MGM Resorts’ bold strategy of suing 
shooting victims pay off?, THE NEVADA INDEPENDENT (July 22, 2018), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/liability-and-an-obscure-law-will-mgm-resorts-bold-strategy-
of-suing-shooting-victims-pay-off [https://perma.cc/X4XU-FM4K].
 14.  Paul Taylor, We’re All in This Together: Extending Sovereign Immunity to Encourage Private 
Parties to Reduce Public Risk, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1595, 1615 (2007). 
 15.  Valley, supra note 13. 
 16.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 861-865, 116 Stat. 296. 
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authority for certifying and designating these technologies and services, as 
well as for administrating regulations consistent with the statute.18 In gen-
eral, Congress intended the Act to encourage private businesses to develop 
security technologies and services used to combat terrorism in the wake of 
the attacks on September 11, 2001.19
With those considerations in mind, there were several issues that arose 
under the SAFETY Act in the Route 91 Harvest Festival litigation. There 
was debate whether the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident qualified as an 
act of terrorism under the SAFETY Act. Particularly, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) has never clearly stated that the incident was 
an act of terrorism,20 leaving uncertainty as to whether MGM’s claim met 
the Act’s requirements.21 After a thorough review of DHS’s website, DHS 
has also never issued any statement whether any particular incident is or is 
not an act of terrorism under the SAFETY Act, thus heightening the uncer-
tainty as to whether the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident was an act of 
terrorism. Additionally, while MGM contracted with a security company 
deploying screening services certified by the Department of Homeland 
Security,22 there was an issue with whether Paddock’s acts at the Mandalay 
Bay Resort are too far removed from the security services at the Route 91 
Harvest Festival to fit within the SAFETY Act and the relevant regulations. 
Although the parties eventually settled these lawsuits, the Route 91 
Harvest Festival litigation highlights uncertainties in applying key provi-
sions of the SAFETY Act as a legislative source of tort reform. Using 
MGM’s lawsuits as a backdrop, this note outlines issues for litigants argu-
ing claims under the SAFETY Act. Part one discusses the provisions of the 
SAFETY Act and DHS’s related regulations. This part also pays particular 
attention to the historical context and legislative purpose behind the 
SAFETY Act’s enactment to show how Congress intended the Act to 
broadly protect security providers from liability stemming from certain 
violent incidents. Part two then considers the legal hurdles litigants must 
address to successfully argue that the SAFETY Act limits their liability for 
a terrorist incident. One of the most significant issues potential future liti-
 18.  Id. at § 441. 
 19.  Alice Crowe, Safety Act Liability Protections for Air Cargo Screeners, 58 FED. LAW. 24, 25 
(2011). 
 20.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY SAFETY ACT, https://safetyact.gov [https://perma.cc/P9TC-
NNM2]; see also McLaughlin, supra note 12. 
 21.  See J. Michael Littlejohn & Lauren P. McLaughlin, Managing Terrorism Risk Safety Act 
Protections for Companies Selling and Using Anti-Terrorism Products and Services, 53 FED. LAW. 34, 
40 (2006). 
 22.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 5, MGM Resorts Int’l v. Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288, 
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gants may face, and which MGM faced, is whether the Secretary of Home-
land Security has determined that an incident was an act of terrorism. 
While the circumstances surrounding the Route 91 Harvest Festival litiga-
tion may be novel in this aspect, that litigation best exemplifies the uncer-
tainty litigants may face in determining whether an incident qualifies as an 
act of terrorism under the SAFETY Act. Finally, part three outlines consid-
erations for Congress to amend the SAFETY Act in light of the legal hur-
dles discussed in part two. As MGM’s lawsuits show, one way that 
Congress could strengthen the SAFETY Act is by clarifying a precise 
method for the Secretary of Homeland Security to determine whether a 
particular incident is an act of terrorism. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE SAFETY ACT
This section first discusses the provisions of the SAFETY Act and the 
accompanying DHS regulations that are most relevant when raising a claim 
under the SAFETY Act, such as in the Route 91 Harvest Festival litigation. 
Second, this section analyzes the legislative purpose of the SAFETY Act 
by looking to the historical context surrounding the Act’s enactment, statu-
tory construction, and legislative history. 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions of the SAFETY Act
In general, the SAFETY Act creates a federal cause of action for 
“claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism” 
where anti-terrorism technologies or services designated or certified by the 
Department of Homeland Security “have been deployed in defense against 
or response or recovery from such act and such claims result or may result 
in loss to the Seller” of the anti-terrorism technologies or services.23 The 
Act grants federal district courts “original and exclusive jurisdiction over 
all actions for any claim or loss or property, personal injury, or death aris-
ing out of, relating to, or resulting from” the act of terrorism.24 Yet this 
cause of action “shall be brought only for claims for injuries that are prox-
imately caused by sellers” of qualified anti-terrorism technology.25 For 
these claims, there can be only one cause of action, and it “may be brought 
only against the Seller of the Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology and 
 23.  6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(1). 
 24.  Id. § 442(a)(2); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.7(d) (2018). 
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may not be brought against the buyers . . . or any other person or entity.”26
The Act also limits liability to the amount of liability insurance that each 
seller must maintain.27
1. Act of Terrorism
The SAFETY Act broadly defines the term, “act of terrorism.” Under 
the statute, an “act of terrorism” is “any act that the Secretary [of Home-
land Security] determines meets the requirements” set out within the 
SAFETY Act’s broad definition.28 Yet the Secretary of Homeland Security 
is required to determine only that any act in question fits the following 
requirements: 
 [T]he act . . . 
I. is unlawful; 
II. causes harm to a person, property, or entity, in the United States, or 
in the case of a domestic United States air carrier or a United 
States-flag vessel (or a vessel based principally in the United 
States on which United States income tax is paid and whose in-
surance coverage is subject to regulation in the United States), 
in or outside the United States; and 
III. uses or attempts to use instrumentalities, weapons or other methods 
designed or intended to cause mass destruction, injury or other 
loss to citizens or institutions of the United States.29
DHS’s regulations do not further clarify what an act of terrorism is.30
The regulations use nearly identical language of the SAFETY Act.31 In its 
final regulations, DHS clarified issues relating only to the geographic loca-
tion of a terrorist act in response to commenters.32 According to the DHS 
regulations, an act occurring outside of the United States can be considered 
an act of terrorism for purposes of the SAFETY Act.33 However, the regu-
lations do not address the procedures and timing for the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to determine whether a particular incident is an act of 
 26.  6 C.F.R. § 25.7(d). 
 27.  6 U.S.C. § 443(c). 
 28.  Id. § 444(2)(A). 
 29.  Id. § 444(2)(B). 
 30.  See 6 C.F.R. § 25.2. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies 
Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act), 71 Fed. Reg. 33,147-01, 33,154 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 
C.F.R. pt. 25 et seq.). 
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terrorism,34 nor whether a mass shooting, such as the Route 91 Harvest 
Festival incident, may qualify as an act of terrorism.35 Particularly, the 
SAFETY Act and the accompanying DHS regulations include a potentially 
over-inclusive definition of terrorism and also fail to define “mass destruc-
tion.”36
2. Sellers
Aside from broadly defining an “act of terrorism,” the SAFETY Act 
itself also does not define the term, “seller,” beyond being “[a]ny person or 
entity that sells or otherwise provides a qualified anti-terrorism technology 
to . . . customers.”37 The Department of Homeland Security regulations 
further add the requirement that a “seller” is also a “person, firm, or other 
entity . . . to whom or to which (as appropriate) a Designation and/or Certi-
fication has been issued under this part (unless the context requires other-
wise).”38
3. Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology
The SAFETY Act applies to “qualified anti-terrorism technology.”39
That includes the following: 
[A]ny product, equipment, service (including support services), device, 
or technology (including information technology) designed, developed, 
modified, or procured for the specific purpose of preventing, detecting, 
identifying, or deterring acts of terrorism or limiting the harm such acts 
might otherwise cause, that is designated as such by the Secretary [of 
Homeland Security].40
DHS further clarifies that “technology” includes “any combination” of 
the enumerated definitions and may also include “[d]esign services, con-
sulting services, engineering services, software development services, 
software integration services, threat assessments, vulnerability studies, and 
 34.  See John J. Pavlick, Jr. & Dismas N. Locaria, Final Safety Act Rule Resolves Some Questions, 
Generates Others, and Creates Important Procurement Linkage to the Safety Act, 42 PROCUREMENT
LAW. 1, 24 (2006). 
 35.  See Regulations Implementing the SAFETY Act, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,154; see also 6 C.F.R. 
§ 25.2. 
 36.  Alison M. Levin, The Safety Act of 2003: Implications for the Government Contractor De-
fense, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 175, 200 (2004). 
 37.  6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(1) (2018). 
 38.  6 C.F.R. § 25.2. 
 39.  6 U.S.C. § 442. 
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other analyses relevant to homeland security.”41 As these regulations show, 
the SAFETY Act applies to a broad range of technologies, including prod-
ucts-based, service-based, and analysis-based technologies.42 While the 
Secretary of Homeland Security has broad discretion in designating tech-
nology as qualified anti-terrorism technology,43 there are still detailed pro-
cedures in this designation process.44
4. Liability Protections
When DHS designates technology as qualified anti-terrorism technol-
ogy, the SAFETY Act provides extensive liability protections. First, there 
is an exclusive cause of action requirement, meaning for any particular act 
of terrorism, there can be only one claim relating to a seller’s use of quali-
fied anti-terrorism technology.45 According to the DHS regulations, this 
claim can be brought only against the seller of the designated technology, 
not the buyers or downstream users.46 In effect, this provision affords sig-
nificant protection from liability for all other companies and persons in the 
stream of commerce from claims under the SAFETY Act. 
Second, damages for claims arising under the SAFETY Act are signif-
icantly limited. Neither punitive damages nor prejudgment interest can be 
awarded.47 Plaintiffs may recover noneconomic damages, such as those for 
physical and emotional pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, or other 
nonpecuniary losses, only if the plaintiff suffered physical harm.48 There is 
also no joint and several liability for noneconomic damages.49 Additional-
ly, liability cannot exceed the seller’s required liability insurance coverage 
limit.50 Because there is no “one-size-fits-all” numerical requirement for 
insurance coverage,51 DHS determines the maximum liability for each sell-
er on an individual basis.52 Each seller must maintain liability insurance at 
that level.53
 41.  6 C.F.R. § 25.2. 
 42.  Regulations Implementing the SAFETY Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,148-49, 33,154 (June 8, 2006) 
(to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25 et seq.). 
 43.  6 C.F.R. § 25.4. 
 44.  Id. § 25.6. 
 45.  Id. § 25.7(d). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  6 U.S.C § 442(b)(1) (2018); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.7(b)(1).
 48.  6 U.S.C. § 442(b)(2). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. § 443(c) (2018); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.7(a). 
 51.  Regulations Implementing the SAFETY Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,149 (June 8, 2006) (to be 
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25 et seq.). 
 52.  6 C.F.R. 25.5(g). 
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There are additional protections for technologies that are certified as 
an “Approved Product for Homeland Security.”54 To be certified, the tech-
nology must first be designated as a qualified anti-terrorism technology and 
then go through a separate application process for certification.55 If certi-
fied, those technologies are also eligible for the government contractor 
defense for claims arising under the SAFETY Act.56 The government con-
tractor defense immunizes defendants from liability.57 There is a rebuttable 
presumption that the government contractor defense applies for claims 
arising under the SAFETY Act regardless of whether or not the seller is 
actually contracting with the federal government (the presumption applies 
even when the seller contracts with state or local governments or private 
entities).58 This presumption can be overcome only by evidence that the 
seller acted “fraudulently or with willful misconduct” during the certifica-
tion application process.59
Thus, whether technology is designated or certified, the SAFETY Act 
provides significant liability protections. DHS provides further details on 
the SAFETY Act online, including application materials and an updated list 
of both designated and certified technologies.60
B. Evidence of Legislative Context and Purpose
While the exact meaning of some of its provisions may be vague when 
applied to incidents, such as the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident, the 
SAFETY Act’s general purpose is clear, given the context of its enactment, 
broad statutory language, and legislative history. The Act serves to encour-
age private security providers to develop and deploy anti-terrorism tech-
nologies and services. To do so, Congress sought to give private actors 
certainty to the extent of any possible liability surrounding terrorist inci-
dents and to also severely limit that liability. 
 54.  6 C.F.R. § 25.9; see also 6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(3). 
 55.  6 C.F.R. § 25.9(a). 
 56.  6 U.S.C. § 442(d); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.8(a). 
 57.  Regulations Implementing the SAFETY Act, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,149 (June 8, 2006) (to be 
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25 et seq.); see also Littlejohn & McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 36–37. 
 58.  6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(1); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.8(b). 
 59.  6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(1); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.8(b) (noting there must be a “knowing and 
deliberate intent to deceive” DHS). 
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1. Historical Context
The SAFETY Act, part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, was 
one of Congress’s responses to the September 11th terrorist attacks.61 Im-
mediately after the attacks, the federal government sought help from the 
private sector in fighting terrorism.62 However, many worried that these 
efforts would be ineffective if security providers never actually deployed 
advancements in security out of fear of legal liability.63 Naturally, even if 
anti-terrorism technology is properly designed and utilized, innovative 
criminals may still overcome this technology.64 And before the September 
11th attacks, private entities did not benefit as much as government entities 
did from sovereign immunity, especially within the context of public safe-
ty.65 Plaintiffs could sue private security companies in state court under 
numerous causes of action, including invasion of privacy or even business 
interruption.66 As a result of this potential liability, private companies were 
often reluctant to develop or deploy new anti-terrorism technologies.67
Although the September 11th attacks highlighted to a global audience 
many of these issues in deploying security technologies, those issues had 
already existed in the United States for years.68 Private companies develop-
ing and deploying national security technologies were often exposed to 
uncertain but sometimes substantial liability, which created a significant 
disincentive to employ these technologies.69 Thus, anti-terrorism technolo-
gies were very narrowly deployed, often only by the federal government.70
Congress previously sought to address these issues, but none of those ef-
forts were as sweeping as the SAFETY Act would be.71 These national 
security concerns largely continued until the September 11th attacks be-
came the most notable example of massive liabilities following a terrorist 
 61.  Littlejohn & McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 35. 
 62.  Paul Taylor, We’re All in This Together: Extending Sovereign Immunity to Encourage Private 
Parties to Reduce Public Risk, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1595, 1602 (2007). 
 63.  Id. at 1603–04. 
 64.  Crowe, supra note 19, at 25. 
 65.  Taylor, supra note 62, at 1604. 
 66.  Littlejohn & McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 35. 
 67.  Crowe, supra note 19, at 25. 
 68.  Taylor, supra note 62, at 1617–18. 
 69.  Id.; see also Ava A. Harter, Encouraging Corporate Innovation for Our Homeland During 
the Best of Times for the Worst of Times: Extending Safety Act Protections to Natural Disasters, 2007
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 7, 4 (2007) (listing examples of significant liability for private industries before 
the September 11th attacks). 
 70.  Taylor, supra note 62, at 1618. 
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incident, as shown by the massive civil tort liabilities in the wake of the 
September 11th attacks.72
In response to these concerns, Congress created the SAFETY Act, one 
of the most extensive examples of legislative tort reform, to encourage 
private actors to develop and deploy anti-terrorism security technologies. 
Of course, the SAFETY Act’s underlying purpose is national security.73
But the statute’s specific provisions reflect the particular concerns specified 
above. 
2. Statutory Construction
The SAFETY Act’s statutory construction, the best evidence of legis-
lative intent, generally shows a broad purpose and scope.74 For example, 
the Act applies to all “claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an 
act of terrorism.”75 This language suggests a generally broad scope. The 
Act also includes a potentially over-inclusive definition of “act of terror-
ism,” encompassing a broad scope of incidents and limited only by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security’s discretion.76 Congress and DHS may 
have intentionally left this definition vague so that the SAFETY Act’s 
scope can evolve alongside terrorist threats, especially given that both of 
these entities have recognized that terrorism is a constantly developing 
threat.77 For instance, the use of weapons of mass destruction was an 
emerging issue at the time of the September 11th attacks, and cyberterror-
ism presents emerging issues today. Still, this definition denotes a broad 
overall scope. Finally, the SAFETY Act applies to a comprehensive range 
of technologies, as explained in detail above.78 The Act can apply to tech-
nology with multiple purposes even if fighting terrorism is not the sole or 
intended purpose.79 The SAFETY Act’s language strongly indicates a gen-
erally broad purpose and potentially over-inclusive scope. 
 72.  Harter, supra note 69, at 5–6. 
 73.  See Levin, supra note 36, at 203; see also H.R. REP. NO. 107-609(I), at 63 (2002), reprinted 
in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1352, 1352. 
 74.  See Levin, supra note 36, at 177–78. 
 75.  6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(1) (2018). 
 76.  Levin, supra note 36, at 200. 
 77.  See H.R. REP. NO. 107-609(I), at 63–64; see also Dep’t of Homeland Security, The 2014 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/qhsr/the-
2014-quadrennial-homeland-security-review-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA3F-H3RS]. 
 78.  See 6 U.S.C. § 444; see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.2 (2018).
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3. Legislative History and DHS’s Interpretation
The SAFETY Act’s legislative history also shows that the primary 
purpose of the Act is to provide certainty to security providers in the hopes 
of encouraging them to develop and deploy anti-terrorism technologies. As 
stated in the House Select Committee on Homeland Security Report, “tech-
nological innovation is the Nation’s frontline defense against the terrorist 
threat.”80 However, the report also stated as follows: 
[T]he Nation’s products liability system threatens to keep important new 
technologies from the market where they could protect our citizens. In 
order to ensure that these important technologies are available, the Select 
Committee believes that it is important to adopt a narrow set of liability 
protections for manufacturers of these important technologies.81
Legislators also generally recognized that the specific legislative pur-
pose was to broadly encourage security providers to develop and deploy 
anti-terrorism technologies and services.82 During congressional debates, 
one representative remarked that the “fatally flawed tort system in America 
and the unbounded threat of liability are blocking the deployment of anti-
terrorism technologies. . . .” but “[t]he SAFETY Act provisions place rea-
sonable and sensible limits on lawsuits so America’s leading technology 
companies will be able to deploy solutions to defeat terrorists.”83
The bill’s supporters in the Senate agreed that the SAFETY Act “helps 
ensure that effective antiterrorism technologies that meet stringent re-
quirements are commercially available. The reality is that without these 
safeguards, the threat of unlimited liability prevents leading technology 
companies from providing their best products to protect American citizens, 
American businesses, and governmental agencies.”84 One senator also rec-
ognized that “[s]ome of our Nation’s top defense contractors will not sell 
[anti-terrorism security] products because they are afraid to risk the future 
of their company on a lawsuit.”85 Overall, Congress acted on the belief that 
“it is essential that we tap into the resources and expertise of America’s 
private sector” because the “government cannot effectively fight this war 
against terrorism without their support.”86 Thus, Congress enacted the 
SAFETY Act in recognition “that the private sector cannot realistically step 
 80.  H.R. REP. NO. 107-609(I), at 118. 
 81.  Id.
 82.  Levin, supra note 36, at 177–78. 
 83.  148 CONG. REC. H5793-06 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. Watts). 
 84.  148 CONG. REC. S11012-02 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Allen). 
 85.  148 CONG. REC. S11405-01 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Warner). 
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up to help wage [the] fight against terrorism without some reasonable pro-
tection from frivolous tort litigation.”87
After Congress enacted the SAFETY Act, DHS stated in its final regu-
lations implementing the Act that its purpose is to “provide[] critical incen-
tives for the development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by 
providing liability protections for providers of ‘qualified anti-terrorism 
technologies.’”88 Likewise, the stated purpose of DHS’s accompanying 
regulations “is to facilitate and promote the development and deployment 
of anti-terrorism technologies that will save lives.”89 With these concerns 
in mind, DHS has interpreted the SAFETY Act to have a broad scope, es-
pecially for applying the government contractor defense.90
In sum, the overall legislative purpose generally shows that the 
SAFETY Act primarily serves to encourage the private security industry to 
develop and deploy anti-terrorism technologies and services. As the Act’s 
broad statutory language, the context of its enactment, and its legislative 
history show, Congress sought to incentivize security providers in this way 
by both (a) severely limiting potential liability and (b) providing certainty 
as to the amount of potential liability. Overall, Congress and DHS intended 
this incentive to apply to a broad scope of conduct. 
II. THE SAFETY ACT IN COURT
This section discusses potential difficulties for litigants in arguing 
SAFETY Act claims. MGM’s lawsuits, the first significant lawsuits to 
debate the SAFETY Act’s provisions, exposed several requirements about 
which the Act is unclear. MGM faced several hurdles to have successfully 
argued that the SAFETY Act limited its liability for the Route 91 Harvest 
Festival incident. Specifically, MGM likely had to, and future litigants may 
also have to, face the difficult task in proving that the Secretary of Home-
land Security has determined that an incident, such as the Route 91 Harvest 
Festival incident, was an act of terrorism and that a qualified seller’s use of 
anti-terrorism technology was the proximate cause of the victims’ injuries. 
After considering the SAFETY Act’s provisions and purpose, this section 
outlines potential methods for litigants and courts to resolve these issues. 
A preliminary step in this analysis is to consider if and how the DHS 
regulations apply to claims under the SAFETY Act. DHS’s interpretation 
 87.  148 CONG. REC. S9200-02 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 88.  Regulations Implementing the SAFETY Act, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,147 (June 8, 2006) (to be 
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25 et seq.). 
 89.  Id. 
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may not necessarily bind courts, but district courts would presumably pro-
vide that interpretation much deference.91 Still, even assuming courts will 
defer to DHS’s regulations, a litigant must show its claims satisfy several 
SAFETY Act requirements. These requirements include (1) showing that 
an incident, such as the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident, was an “act of 
terrorism”; (2) showing that the Secretary of Homeland Security has the 
sole authority to determine whether incidents were acts of terrorism; and 
(3) showing that the Secretary did so in that instance. This note expands 
upon these issues in greater detail in the sections that follow. 
A. Protections for Different Parties under the SAFETY Act
The first issue litigants, such as MGM (and the Mandalay Bay Resort), 
must address is whether that litigant is a “seller.” This present a difficult 
argument for plaintiffs in circumstances similar to the Route 91 Harvest 
Festival litigation—where MGM contracted with a security provider and 
did not provide the security services itself. While it may be arguable in 
such a case that a party similar to MGM has “otherwise provide[d] Quali-
fied Anti–Terrorism Technology to any customer(s)”92 by contracting with 
a security provider, the security contractor, not MGM, actually had the 
qualified anti-terrorism technology certified by DHS in this scenario.93
Still, the DHS regulations do include an exception that the designation 
and/or certification requirement applies “unless the context requires other-
wise.”94 There is no apparent legislative history or administrative guidance 
on exactly what circumstances could give rise to this exception. However, a 
plaintiff like MGM must argue that the incident (e.g., the Route 91 Harvest 
Festival incident) falls within this exception. Although both the statutory 
language and legislative history generally indicate a broad scope for the 
SAFETY Act, the primary purpose of the Act, as explained in detail above, 
is to provide incentives and liability protection for private security compa-
nies, not necessarily hospitality or entertainment companies who hire pri-
vate security companies. And so, potential plaintiffs (like MGM) face a 
steep hurdle in showing it is a “seller” for purposes of the Act. 
But the analysis does not stop there. Even if a party like MGM is not a 
“seller”— the intended beneficiary of the SAFETY Act’s protections—it 
could still have significant liability protections if the victims’ claims fall 
 91.  Littlejohn & McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 40. 
 92.  6 U.S.C. § 443(a)(1) (2018); see also 6 C.F.R. § 25.2 (2018).
 93.  See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
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under the SAFETY Act. Under the DHS regulations, plaintiffs can bring 
claims for SAFETY Act violations only against the seller.95 That is, a po-
tential plaintiff like MGM may still be successful so long as (1) the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security first determines that the incident was an act of 
terrorism, and (2) the security contractor’s use of qualified anti-terrorism 
technology was the proximate cause of the victims’ injuries. Yet these can 
be significant obstacles for some plaintiffs, such as MGM, to overcome.96
B. Defining an Act of Terrorism
The litigation following the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident ex-
posed potential difficulties in determining whether an incident was an “act 
of terrorism” under the SAFETY Act—even if the circumstances surround-
ing that incident were somewhat unique. Among the most significant issues 
for MGM to have been successful (had the court addressed the merits of 
MGM’s claims) was whether the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident was an 
act of terrorism under the SAFETY Act. The definition of “an act of terror-
ism” is somewhat vague when applied in this context. The Act also requires 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to have first determined that the inci-
dent was an act of terrorism. Accordingly, future litigation may need to 
address (a) whether the Secretary of Homeland Security has the sole au-
thority to determine what incidents are acts of terrorism, and (b) how to 
determine whether the Secretary has done so. This note discusses issues 
relating to the Secretary’s determination in later sections and focuses this 
section on the Act’s other requirements for an act of terrorism: the act is 
unlawful; harms people, property, or an entity in the U.S.; and uses or at-
tempts to use weapons designed to cause mass destruction. 
1. Statutory Definition
Regardless of whether the Secretary ever determined that the Route 91 
Harvest Festival was an act of terrorism, the statutory meaning of an act of 
 95.  Id. § 25.7(d).
 96.  Some commentators have speculated that the SAFETY Act may not actually be limited to 
acts of terrorism. See Littlejohn & McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 40 (noting the broad statutory lan-
guage in § 442(a)(1) includes claims “arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism”). 
Due to how rarely the SAFETY Act has ever been involved in litigation, courts have never directly 
addressed this issue. See Ivyport Logistical Servs., Inc. v. Caribbean Airport Facilities, Inc., 502 F. 
Supp. 2d 227, 230 (D.P.R. 2007) (stating merely that the SAFETY Act does not apply because “it is 
limited to specific types of claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Still, it is likely courts will read 6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(1) consistently 
with DHS’s interpretation under 6 C.F.R. § 25.7 as requiring an act of terrorism to occur for SAFETY 
Act protections to apply. In its ordinary meaning, a claim cannot arise out of, relate to, or result from an 
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terrorism is so broad that it may include that incident. Paddock’s attack was 
clearly unlawful and caused harm to people in the United States. And alt-
hough the Act does not precisely define “mass destruction,”97 it is hardly 
debatable that Paddock used weapons “designed or intended to cause mass 
destruction, injury or other loss” to U.S. citizens.98 Paddock fired upon an 
open crowd, killing fifty-eight people and injuring approximately 500 oth-
ers.99 Looking at this statutory text alone, this incident may fit within the 
general parameters of an act of terrorism (assuming that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security determined this incident was an act of terrorism). 
2. Comparison to Other Statutory Definitions
In future litigation involving the SAFETY Act, courts may consider 
guidance beyond the statutory text. This analysis, however, becomes more 
complicated if, considering how MGM’s lawsuits were the first notable 
cases involving the SAFETY Act, courts look to similar statutes for guid-
ance. Generally, other definitions in the federal code for terms similar to 
“act of terrorism” require the actor to have had a political motivation. For 
instance, under the Homeland Security Act generally, “terrorism” means 
any unlawful activity that (a) “is dangerous to human life or potentially 
destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources” and (b) “appears to 
be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence 
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnap-
ping.”100 And federal criminal laws define “domestic terrorism” as an ille-
gal act occurring “primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States” that is “dangerous to human life” and that meets the exact same 
intent requirement as the Homeland Security Act’s definition of “terror-
ism.”101
Likewise, “terrorism,” as it applies to the State Department’s annual 
country reports on terrorism, means “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.”102 In similar vein, other immigration laws applying to 
inadmissible aliens define “terrorist activity,” in relevant part, as any illegal 
activity that involves certain enumerated offenses, such as a “violent attack 
 97.  Another section of the Homeland Security chapter of the federal code defines “mass killings” 
as “3 or more killings in a single incident.” 6 U.S.C. § 455(d)(2)(A) (2018). 
 98.  6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(B) (2018). 
 99.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 1, at 5. 
 100.  6 U.S.C. § 101(18) (2018). 
 101.  18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2018). 
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upon an internationally protected person,” “[a]n assassination,” or “seizing 
or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another 
individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental 
organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the individual seized or detained.”103
Overall, if a court were to construe the definition of “act of terrorism” 
like these other provisions, then the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident may 
not have fit this definition. Law enforcements agencies investigating the 
incident apparently have not found any motivation, let alone a political 
motivation, behind Paddock’s acts.104
Yet the SAFETY Act is different. The Act includes a broad definition 
of “act of terrorism.” And noticeably absent from this statute is any re-
quirement relating to the actor’s intent. Given how courts are often resistant 
to consider legislative silence when other statutes include certain provi-
sions,105 this silence may indicate that an “act of terrorism” under the 
SAFETY Act can apply to a broad category of conduct within the Secretary 
of Homeland Security’s discretion even if a particular incident would not 
necessarily be an act of terrorism under other statutes that require a politi-
cal motivation. Because the Act serves to shield security providers from 
potentially massive liability, not requiring a political motivation and in-
stead allowing a broad scope of coverage is arguably consistent with the 
Act’s purpose. Thus, numerous incidents, such as the Route 91 Harvest 
Festival incident, may fall within the SAFETY Act’s meaning of “act of 
terrorism.” However, this is true only if the Secretary of Homeland Securi-
ty first determines that the incident was an act of terrorism. 
C. Authority to Determine Acts of Terrorism
Even if an incident like the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident fit 
within the general definition of an “act of terrorism,” the SAFETY Act still 
requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security first determines that the 
incident meets the statutory definition. This note explores two issues that 
future litigation likely must address in resolving SAFETY Act claims: (1) 
whether the Secretary of Homeland Security has the sole authority to de-
 103.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2018). 
 104.  Vanessa Romo, Police End Las Vegas Shooting Investigation; No Motive Found, NPR (Aug. 
3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/03/635507299/las-vegas-shooting-investigation-closed-no-
motive-found [https://perma.cc/R6JN-SY6S]. 
 105.  Cf. Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1177 (2017) (“We have said that ‘[d]rawing 
meaning from silence is particularly inappropriate’ where ‘Congress has shown that it knows how to 
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termine whether incidents are acts of terrorism, and (2) whether the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security has actually done so. Although the Secretary 
appears to have sole authority to determine what are acts of terrorism under 
the SAFETY Act, the litigation following the Route 91 Harvest Festival 
highlights the difficulties in determining whether the Secretary has made 
this determination. 
1. The Secretary’s SAFETY Act Authority
Future lawsuits may need to address whether the Secretary of Home-
land Security has the sole authority to determine what incidents are acts of 
terrorism.106 Some of the victims of the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident 
argued that the Secretary of Homeland Security has the exclusive authority 
to determine whether incidents are acts of terrorism and that courts may not 
even make or review this determination.107 On its face, the SAFETY Act 
supports this view. After all, the phrase, “act of terrorism,” means “any act 
that the Secretary [of Homeland Security] determines meets the require-
ments under subparagraph (B), as such requirements are further defined 
and specified by the Secretary.”108 And the Act also states that “[t]he Secre-
tary [of Homeland Security] shall be responsible for the administration of 
this part.”109 DHS interprets the Secretary’s authority on this matter to be 
exclusive, allowing the Secretary of Homeland Security to delegate to the 
Under Secretary for Science and Technology “[a]ll of the Secretary’s re-
sponsibilities, powers, and functions under the SAFETY Act, except the 
authority to declare that an act is an Act of Terrorism.”110 At a minimum, 
the SAFETY Act and the DHS regulations confer broad discretion to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. At a maximum, these provisions confer 
exclusive authority to the Secretary. These provisions, however, suggest 
the Secretary has exclusive authority. 
The legislative context and purpose also suggest that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security having sole authority to declare acts of terrorism may 
be desirable. Congress and DHS sought to encourage private security com-
panies to combat terrorism by providing broad liability protections and 
certainty to the extent of potential liability for future incidents. The Secre-
tary having sole authority to determine what incidents invoke the Act’s 
 106.  See Littlejohn & McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 40 (outlining possible issues to litigate gener-
ally under the SAFETY Act). 
 107.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand at 10, Sheppard v. Mandalay Bay, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-01120, 
2018 WL 3738838 (D. Nev. 2018). 
 108.  6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(A) (2018). 
 109.  Id. § 441(a). 
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protection gives private security providers more certainty as to whether 
they would be liable for incidents. Under this interpretation, security pro-
viders do not have to monitor whether one of numerous officers or entities 
declares an incident to be an act of terrorism. 
2. Comparison to Other Statutory Authorities
The issue becomes murkier after considering how other statutes dele-
gate similar authority in other situations. One example is the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA),111 a congressional effort around the 
same time as the SAFETY Act to limit insurance claims related to terrorist 
incidents. As with the SAFETY Act, TRIA gives the Secretary of the 
Treasury the power to certify acts of terrorism.112 Unlike in the SAFETY 
Act, TRIA states that the Secretary of the Treasury must certify acts of 
terrorism “in concurrence with the Secretary of State, and the Attorney 
General of the United States.”113 But provisions in TRIA—that are not in 
the SAFETY Act—also clearly establish that the Secretary of the Treas-
ury’s authority to certify acts of terrorism is final. The Secretary of the 
Treasury’s determination to certify or not certify an act of terrorism “shall 
be final, and shall not be subject to judicial review.”114 Under TRIA, the 
Secretary of the Treasury also “may not delegate or designate to any other 
officer, employee, or person, any determination” of whether an act of ter-
rorism has occurred.115
In similar vein, where Congress has intended to allow for congres-
sional or judicial review of similar declarations, the statutory text clearly 
indicates that ability for review. For instance, the Secretary of State may 
designate foreign terrorist organizations “in consultation with the Secretary 
of the Treasury and the Attorney General.”116 But, under clear statutory 
language, “Congress, by an Act of Congress, may block or revoke a desig-
nation[.]”117 Likewise, the precise scope and extent of judicial review al-
lowed is also expressly stated.118
Yet to be successful, future litigants may face a difficult hurdle. Those 
litigants likely must show that the SAFETY Act’s text is vague and that 
these outside provisions overcome the Act’s statutory language. To do so, a 
 111.  Pub. L. No. 107–297, 116 Stat 2322 (2002).  
 112.  Id. § 102(1)(A). 
 113.  Id.
 114.  Id. § 102(1)(C). 
 115.  Id. § 102(1)(D). 
 116.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(4) (2018). 
 117.  Id. § 1189(a)(5). 
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litigant will likely have to argue the differences in how the SAFETY Act 
delegates the power to determine an incident is an act of terror and how 
similar statutes, such as TRIA, delegate similar power suggest that the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security does not have exclusive authority in declaring 
acts of terrorism. But the SAFETY Act does not state that the Secretary 
must consult with other officials, as TRIA does. Similarly, the absence of 
any provisions allowing for or defining the scope of outside review may 
also suggest that Congress did not allow for review of the Secretary’s de-
terminations. And most significantly, the statutory meaning of “act of ter-
rorism” requires the Secretary to first determine that the incident meets the 
statutory requirements. If a future litigant—in a situation as uncertain as the 
Route 91 Harvest Festival incident was—is to be successful on the merits, 
these issues can be significant barriers to overcome. 
D. Process for Determining Whether an Act is an Act of Terrorism
Even if the SAFETY Act delegates sole authority to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to declare acts of terrorism, future lawsuits will likely 
need to address whether the Secretary has actually declared the incident to 
be one. The Act currently is not clear about how the Secretary may do this. 
Neither the Act nor the DHS regulations define how “the Secretary deter-
mines” an incident is an act of terrorism119 or what qualifies as the Secre-
tary “determin[ing] [a particular incident] to have met the . . . 
requirements” of the Act.120 Additionally, neither DHS’s general website121
nor DHS’s website for the SAFETY Act122 further define this process. And 
a careful review of both websites reveals no official statement or instance 
where DHS has ever explicitly stated whether any other incident is or is not 
an act of terrorism invoking SAFETY Act protections. 
As a result, courts may look to the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage for guidance. On its face, all the SAFETY Act requires is for the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to determine, rather than designate or cer-
tify, an incident to be an act of terrorism. In its ordinary meaning, “deter-
mination” means “[t]he act of deciding something officially; esp., a final 
decision by a court or administrative agency.”123 Likewise, “determine” 
means, in relevant part, “to fix conclusively or authoritatively” or “to come 
 119.  6 U.S.C. § 444(2)(A) (2018). 
 120.  6 C.F.R. § 25.2 (2018). 
 121.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/ [http://perma.cc/Z5B2-6MLH]. 
 122.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY SAFETY ACT, supra note 20. 
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to a decision.”124 The definitions do imply some affirmative act on the part 
of the Secretary of Homeland Security is required; however, they still offer 
little guidance on this issue. Through comparison to other statutory 
schemes, it appears the SAFETY Act requires a relatively informal process 
for the Secretary to make a determination. However, there is still a need for 
Congress or the courts to clarify how potential litigants can know the Sec-
retary has done so—and the Route 91 Harvest Festival litigation outlines 
this issue of potential uncertainty. 
1. Comparison to Other Statutory Schemes
To determine how the Secretary of Homeland Security officially de-
termines that an incident is an act of terrorism, courts may again compare 
the SAFETY Act to other similar statutory schemes. For example, the Pub-
lic Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 (PREP Act)125 is 
informative primarily because it was based on the SAFETY Act.126 The 
PREP Act provides a specific process and time for the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to declare that a disease or health condition is a public 
health emergency.127 The Secretary of Health and Human Services “may 
make a declaration, through publication in the Federal Register, recom-
mending, under conditions as the Secretary may specify, the manufacture, 
testing, development, distribution, administration, or use of one or more 
covered countermeasures, and stating that” the PREP Act’s liability protec-
tions apply.128 This declaration must contain certain contents, such as stat-
ing the specific health risks included and how long the declaration is in 
place.129
Under another similar statutory scheme, the Secretary of State may 
designate foreign terrorist organizations under a statutorily defined proce-
dure.130 To do so, the Secretary of State must first notify certain congres-
sional leaders in writing that the Secretary of State intends to designate an 
organization as a foreign terrorist organization and then publish the desig-
nation in the Federal Register seven days later.131 Both the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services and the Secretary of State have statutory au-
 124.  Determine, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2019), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/determine [https://perma.cc/CEK3-9HFU]. 
 125.  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2018). 
 126.  See Harter, supra note 69, at 23. 
 127.  42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b). 
 128.  Id. § 247d-6d(b)(1). 
 129.  Id. § 247d-6d(b)(2). 
 130.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2) (2018). 
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thority to designate public safety threats through formal and statutorily 
defined processes. These provisions may suggest that Congress typically 
intends for this type of designation to be through a formal process, such as 
publication in the Federal Register. 
But yet again, the SAFETY Act does not include this sort of formal 
process for the Secretary of Homeland Security to determine that incidents 
are acts of terrorism. This silence may lead courts to conclude that Con-
gress did not intend for a formal process under the SAFETY Act. A court 
may conclude that any absence of this language was intentional.132 The 
SAFETY Act’s text suggests so; the Act uses the term, “determine,” in-
stead of “designate” or “certify,” as the other statutes do. Still, it would 
make little sense if the Secretary of Homeland Security could “determine” 
that an act is an “act of terrorism” without some sort of official statement—
even if this is done through a slightly more informal process than publish-
ing in the Federal Register. Thus, while the Secretary of Homeland Securi-
ty may not need to publish this determination in the Federal Register, the 
Secretary still needs to somehow notify the public that an incident is an 
“act of terrorism.”133 However courts may eventually resolve this issue, it 
can be difficult for potential litigants to determine whether an incident was 
an act of terrorism under the SAFETY Act; the Route 91 Harvest Festival 
litigation is an example of such an instance—even if the circumstances 
surrounding that particular incident were somewhat unique. 
2. The Route 91 Harvest Festival Incident as an Act of Terrorism
The Route 91 Harvest Festival litigation helps expose the uncertainty 
for potential litigants to determine whether the SAFETY Act applies to a 
specific incident when the Act does not clearly define how the Secretary of 
Homeland Security officially determines that an incident was an act of 
terrorism. In that instance, MGM relied on four sources to argue that the 
Secretary made this determination: (1) the acting Secretary of Homeland 
 132.  Cf. Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1177 (“We have said that ‘[d]rawing meaning 
from silence is particularly inappropriate’ where ‘Congress has shown that it knows how to direct 
sentencing practices in express terms.’”) (internal citations omitted).
 133.  Because the legislative intent behind the SAFETY Act includes providing certainty and limits 
to security providers’ liability for terrorist incidents, this litigation outlines an issue for the legislature to 
consider in amending the SAFETY Act and fulfilling its statutory purpose. As a threshold matter, the 
SAFETY Act could reasonably require this determination to be in writing on DHS’s website, as DHS 
often issues statements on incidents this way. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Security, Statement By The 
Acting Press Secretary On Apparent Act Of Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/10/31/statement-acting-press-secretary-apparent-act-terrorism 
[https://perma.cc/XVS2-MUGE] (noting DHS is aware of a particular incident and describing that 
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Security’s November 30, 2017, congressional testimony; (2) a May 2018 
DHS release; (3) the Secretary of Homeland Security’s May 15, 2018, con-
gressional testimony; and (4) a June 4, 2018, DHS announcement.134 What-
ever communications qualify as the Secretary’s “determination,” it would 
be problematic for this type of evidence to be sufficient. 
MGM’s first source of the Secretary’s “determination” was the acting 
Secretary of Homeland Security’s November 30, 2017, congressional tes-
timony. In this testimony, the acting Secretary stated that “terrorists and 
other violent criminals are placing significant emphasis on attacking soft 
targets. We have seen this with recent tragedies in Nevada, New York, and 
Texas.”135 Those tragedies refer to the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident, 
the October 31, 2017, incident in New York City where an ISIS-inspired 
driver ran over victims, and the November 5, 2017, shooting at a church in 
Texas, respectively. There was nothing, however, in the acting Secretary’s 
statement stating that she ever determined that these “tragedies” were acts 
of terrorism.136 The acting Secretary may have concluded that acts involv-
ing “terrorist and other violent criminals” were not necessarily acts of ter-
rorism for purposes of the SAFETY Act. Particularly, “tragedies” and 
“terrorist[s] and other violent criminals” are generalized terms that stray 
from the Act’s terminology. Even with the Act’s broad scope, the Act still 
draws a line at incidents that the Secretary of Homeland Security deter-
mines to be acts of terrorism. It could prove problematic if remarks like this 
are sufficient to trigger SAFETY Act liability protections. For example, 
potential litigants may then have to consider all of the Secretary of Home-
land Security’s public statements to know whether the SAFETY Act bars 
any claims. 
MGM’s second source, DHS’s May 2018 release, raised similar con-
cerns. The release mentioned that “the U.S. has experienced mass shootings 
in . . . a concert” but did not explicitly mention the Route 91 Harvest Festi-
val incident or state that the Secretary determined it was an act of terrorism 
 134.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand, supra note 107, at 10–11; see also Complaint for Declaratory 
Relief, supra note 1, at 53–54. 
 135.  Dep’t of Homeland Security, Written testimony of DHS Acting Secretary Elaine Duke for a 
House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing Titled “World Wide Threats: Keeping America 
Secure in the New Age of Terror” (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/11/30/written-
testimony-dhs-acting-secretary-elaine-duke-house-committee-homeland-security 
[https://perma.cc/H2LV-MJVK]. 
 136.  A DHS statement on the New York incident did label it an “apparent act of terrorism” but did 
not state that the acting Secretary ever determined the incident actually was an “act of terrorism” under 
the SAFETY Act. Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 133. There is no statement on DHS’s web-
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as opposed to a “mass shooting.”137 As with the acting Secretary’s congres-
sional testimony, if this release was sufficient to prove a “determination,” it 
could similarly create uncertainty as to whether other incidents prompt 
SAFETY Act protections. 
Likewise, the other sources MGM cited did not mention the Route 91 
Harvest Festival incident. The Secretary of Homeland Security’s May 15, 
2018, congressional testimony mentioned that DHS is “seeking to ramp up 
‘soft target’ security efforts” to “address threats to soft targets – includ-
ing . . . entertainment venues, major events, and public spaces” but not that 
the incident was an “act of terrorism.”138 And DHS’s June 4, 2018, an-
nouncement merely mentioned that because of “the increased emphasis by 
terrorists and other extremist actors to leverage less sophisticated methods 
to inflict harm in public areas, it is vital that the public and private sectors 
collaborate to enhance security of locations such as . . . special event ven-
ues, and similar facilities.”139 Overall, none of these sources plainly showed 
that the Secretary of Homeland Security ever determined that the Route 91 
Harvest Festival incident was an act of terrorism. 
There was also significant evidence weighing against MGM’s claim. 
First, at the time of this note’s publication, , there was a disclaimer on 
DHS’s SAFETY Act website directly stating that the Secretary of Home-
land Security has never determined the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident 
to be an act of terrorism (while also noting that DHS was currently review-
ing the matter).140 Also, DHS issued an initial statement on the incident, 
 137.  Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Soft Targets and 
Crowded Places Security Plan Overview (May 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-Soft-Target-Crowded-Place-Security-Plan-
Overview-052018-508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2S9-U6Q4]. 
 138.  Dep’t of Homeland Security, Written testimony of DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen for a 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Hearing Titled “Authorities and 
Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the United States” (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/05/15/written-testimony-dhs-secretary-nielsen-senate-committee-
homeland-security-and [https://perma.cc/YC2E-ABMR]. 
 139.  Securing Soft Targets and Crowded Places, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/securing-soft-targets-and-crowded-places [http://perma.cc/SN72-MQ4F]. 
 140.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY SAFETY ACT, supra note 20. The statement read as follows:  
Route 91 Harvest Festival Mass Shooting Incident - October 1, 2017 : According to recent 
court filings, entities involved in litigation relating to the Route 91 Harvest Festival mass 
shooting incident have cited the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies 
Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441-444 (the “SAFETY Act”). The SAFETY Act provides liability 
protections relating to the deployment of “qualified anti-terrorism technologies” in defense 
against, response to, or recovery from an “act of terrorism.” Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 444(2), the 
Secretary of Homeland Security possesses the authority to determine whether an act was an 
“act of terrorism” for purposes of the SAFETY Act. To date, the Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity has not made any such determination regarding the Route 91 Harvest Festival mass 
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referred to there as a “horrific shooting” and a “tragedy” but did not indi-
cate that the Secretary determined that the incident was an act of terror-
ism.141 At the time of this note’s publication, DHS’s website did not 
include any follow-up statement indicating otherwise. 
In sum, because the SAFETY Act lacks a defined method for the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security to officially determine whether an incident 
was an act of terrorism, there can be much uncertainty whether the 
SAFETY Act applies to a specific incident. As a result, both litigants and 
courts may have a more difficult time resolving SAFETY Act claims when 
it is unclear whether or not the Secretary has made a determination. The 
Route 91 Harvest Festival litigation exemplifies this possibility, even if it 
followed somewhat unique circumstances. In that instance, none of MGM’s 
proffered statements directly showed that the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity ever determined that the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident was an act 
of terrorism. Even if the acting Secretary’s comments acknowledged that 
the incident could have been an act of terrorism and even if Congress did 
not intend a formal process to do so (as Congress did with other statutes), 
these comments were likely too informal to have indicated an official de-
termination. On the other hand, if MGM’s proffered evidence was suffi-
cient to show that the Secretary made a determination under the Act, such a 
low threshold could heighten uncertainty as to whether an incident triggers 
the SAFETY Act’s liability protections. More importantly, however, this 
litigation shows the difficulties that potential litigants may face in deter-
mining whether the Secretary of Homeland Security has determined that an 
incident was an act of terrorism for purposes of the Act. 
E. Proximate Cause of Victims’ Injuries
In addition to addressing those issues outlined above, plaintiffs raising 
a SAFETY Act claim must show that the “seller’s” conduct proximately 
caused the victims’ injuries. MGM, for example, would have had to prove 
that its security contractor—the seller of the qualified anti-terrorism tech-
nology at the Route 91 Harvest Festival—proximately caused the victims’ 
injuries to be successful on the merits of its claim. The exclusive federal 
cause of action for “claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from an 
act of terrorism,” as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
applies “only for claims for injuries that are proximately caused by sellers” 
Id.
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of qualified anti-terrorism technology.142 While MGM’s lawsuit does not 
highlight any novel questions to litigate under this requirement, it is still 
important to mention the proximate cause requirement since other potential 
SAFETY Act claims must also address the issue. 
Although this note does not attempt to resolve this issue, MGM’s ar-
gument appears to have been quite a gamble. MGM argued that the vic-
tims’ claims “implicate[d] security at the concert, including training, 
emergency response, evacuation and adequacy of egress” and “may 
[have] . . . result[ed] in loss to . . . the ‘Seller[.]’”143 Paddock’s attack was 
also directed at concert-goers, and the security contractor was presumably 
also trying to protect against a similar attack from occurring within the 
festival grounds by screening concert-goers. However, Paddock fired upon 
the crowd from a room at the Mandalay Bay Resort, not from the Route 91 
Harvest Festival grounds (where the security contractor screened concert-
goers).144 One likely issue with MGM’s argument was that the victims 
never implicated the security contractor in this incident. The victims did 
not have claims against the security contractor and, thus, never argued that 
their claims were for injuries proximately caused by the “seller.”145 How 
this issue would have been resolved is beyond the scope of this note. How-
ever, future potential litigants should not overlook this proximate cause 
element; it may create more issues when raising a claim under the 
SAFETY Act, such as in the case of the Route 91 Harvest Festival litiga-
tion. 
III. NEW CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SAFETY ACT
Regardless of how courts may resolve claims such as the Route 91 
Harvest Festival litigation, those lawsuits highlight concerns for applying 
the SAFETY Act. This litigation was the first time that the SAFETY Act 
has been the focus of such controversial litigation. And a review of DHS’s 
and the SAFETY Act’s websites show that DHS has never clearly stated 
that the SAFETY Act has ever applied to any incidents. Thus, one may 
assume that Congress has overlooked the Act’s provisions since its enact-
ment. But since then, the SAFETY Act has mostly benefited from strong 
bipartisan support146 even though the Act was originally criticized in both 
 142.  6 U.S.C. § 442(a)(1) (2018). 
 143.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 1, at 47.
 144.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand, supra note 107, at 14–15. 
 145.  Id. at 11.
 146.  Taylor, supra note 62, at 1639 (citing subsequent bipartisan efforts by Congress to direct 
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the House and Senate as being potentially overreaching and protecting 
security companies no matter how culpable they may act.147 There have 
also been recent efforts to broaden the SAFETY Act by clearly making it 
applicable to cybersecurity threats (even if Congress has not yet given sig-
nificant attention those potential amendments).148
Still, MGM’s lawsuits show a need to address issues in applying the 
SAFETY Act because Congress can now consider how the Act may apply 
to incidents that have occurred since the September 11th attacks. This liti-
gation not only offers a chance to revisit the SAFETY Act as a whole, but 
also provides Congress a chance to clarify uncertainties under the Act that 
these lawsuits expose. 
A. Revisiting the SAFETY Act’s Purpose
The liability protections under the SAFETY Act are generally still de-
sirable in the years since the September 11th attacks. The Act creates 
enormous incentives for the private sector to improve safety and security 
standards—a goal still desirable today. Allowing certain technology and 
services to be designated or certified still enhances competition between 
security companies and may create new industry standards based on desig-
nated and certified technologies.149 These benefits extend beyond incidents 
falling under the Act’s scope since these security products and practices are 
still employed in circumstances outside of acts of terrorism. 
And alternatives to the SAFETY Act may be less desirable. For ex-
ample, one alternative would be for Congress to replace the Act with a 
scheme for the federal government to indemnify otherwise qualifying 
sellers under the Act.150 However, as one commentator has noted, an in-
demnification scheme would also expose taxpayer funds to the same uncer-
tainty and risk of liability that the SAFETY Act serves to limit.151
Likewise, relying on victim compensation funds could also be inefficient in 
serving the SAFETY Act’s purpose. Because Congress sought to afford 
security providers certainty and protection for potential liability in terrorist 
incidents, security providers would not benefit from the same certainty in 
the amount of their potential liability if they must constantly rely on the 
 147.  H.R. REP. NO. 107-609(I), at 221–22 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1352, 1419; see 
also Levin, supra note 35, at 178. 
 148.  See Cyber SAFETY Act of 2018, S. 2392, 115th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2018). 
 149.  Harter, supra note 69, at 15. 
 150.  See H.R. REP. NO. 107-609(I), at 222. 
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federal government to establish victim compensation funds for each possi-
ble act of terrorism. 
B. Redefining Acts of Terrorism
The MGM lawsuits provide an opportunity for Congress to strengthen 
the SAFETY Act by precisely defining its scope and application. Specifi-
cally, MGM’s lawsuits expose new, perhaps even overlooked, issues in 
applying the SAFETY Act for Congress to consider resolving. 
First, the SAFETY Act provides a broad, yet still somewhat vague, 
meaning of “act of terrorism.” As explained in detail above, the Act’s text 
does not require a political intent behind an act of terrorism, as other stat-
utes require. There is also no definition within the Act for “mass destruc-
tion.” This somewhat vague definition vests wide discretion in the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to determine what incidents invoke 
SAFETY Act protections. MGM’s lawsuits also expose how a potentially 
overbroad definition may afford liability protections for incidents that 
would not qualify as acts of terrorism under other statutes. For example, if 
the Secretary of Homeland Security determined that the Route 91 Harvest 
Festival incident was an act of terrorism for purposes of the Act, the inci-
dent may clearly qualify for SAFETY Act protections despite the shooter 
having no political motivation for the incident. This example exposes how 
the Act’s primary purpose is to protect security providers beyond those 
terrorist incidents, such as the September 11th attacks, which Congress 
clearly considered when enacting the SAFETY Act.152
Yet these uncertainties arguably should not result in significant chang-
es to the statutory definition of “act of terrorism.” Affording the Secretary 
discretion in determining which incidents fall under the SAFETY Act al-
lows the Act to adapt to evolving threats. MGM’s lawsuits merely expose 
how the SAFETY Act’s liability protections can be far-reaching. 
C. Providing Certainty to when the SAFETY Act Applies
Another problem MGM’s lawsuits expose is whether the SAFETY 
Act grants the Secretary of Homeland Security the sole discretion to deter-
 152.  Although the September 11th attacks were the primary motivation behind the SAFETY Act, 
other incidents since then have been much more controversial in whether they are designated as terrorist 
acts or not—often drawing divisions along partisan lines. The SAFETY Act, however, provides finality 
as to whether or not an incident is an act of terrorism, invoking liability protections for security provid-
ers. But the SAFETY Act only provides this certainty if DHS issues a clear statement on whether or not 
the Secretary of Homeland Security has determined that a particular incident is or is not an act of terror-
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mine whether an incident is an act of terrorism. Because the legislative 
purpose of the Act is to encourage security innovation by affording security 
providers certainty in their potential liabilities, a clear way to provide cer-
tainty is for the Secretary to expressly have the sole authority to make these 
determinations. Even though courts may address this issue through future 
litigation, the Act could benefit, as other statutes do, by expressly stating 
whether the Secretary has the sole authority in this area. 
But more importantly, there is ambiguity in how the Secretary of 
Homeland Security actually determines whether an incident is an act of 
terrorism under the Act.153 There is no defined method under the Act for 
security providers or potential plaintiffs to know whether the Secretary of 
Homeland Security ever makes this determination. Differences between the 
SAFETY Act and other statutory schemes suggests that Congress intended 
a unique process under the Act. And because there have never been any 
statements from DHS that any other incident was or was not an act of ter-
rorism under the Act, it is unclear whether the SAFETY Act has ever ex-
plicitly applied to any incident. This gap raises potentially significant 
issues. 
Most obviously, security providers and potential plaintiffs may not 
know whether certain claims are barred under the SAFETY Act until plain-
tiffs raise their claims in court. This possibility directly contradicts the 
Act’s purpose to afford security providers certainty that they will not be 
sued after terrorist incidents. 
And changes in DHS leadership or administrations could also raise 
uncertainties about whether the Act applies. The Secretary’s determinations 
need to be permanent to truly be consistent with the legislative purpose of 
providing certainty. But as DHS leadership may change, it might be possi-
ble for the outgoing Secretary to make a determination and the incoming 
Secretary to then change course before the public is aware. MGM’s law-
suits highlight this possibility. Assume, for sake of argument, that the act-
ing Secretary determined that the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident was 
an act of terrorism in her November 30, 2017, congressional testimony 
(occurring before MGM filed its declaratory judgment lawsuits). Under the 
current statutory scheme, the current Secretary possibly could have then 
overridden this determination through the statement on the SAFETY Act’s 
 153.  It is possible that DHS notifies security providers with designated or certified technologies 
when an incident is an act of terrorism. But if the statutory purpose of the SAFETY Act is to prevent 
these security providers from ever being brought to court for acts of terrorism, then Congress can 
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website. Without a precise process for security providers and the public to 
know when the Secretary has determined that an incident is or is not an act 
of terrorism, the SAFETY Act allows uncertainty whether its protections 
do—or will continue to—apply. 
Although these concerns may not be relevant to every possible act of 
terrorism, this litigation outlines the potential for Congress to strengthen 
the Act. One possible solution is to require the Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity to publish in the Federal Register any decisions about whether inci-
dents were acts of terrorism, as other statutes require. Congress could 
accompany this solution by requiring the Secretary to issue a statement on 
either DHS’s or the SAFETY Act’s website that the Secretary intends to 
publish this decision in the Federal Register. This solution would provide 
both immediate notice to security providers and potential plaintiffs, as well 
as certainty that the Secretary’s decision is final and binding. 
D. Considering Other Implications of MGM’s Lawsuits
It is likely that these lawsuits will result is some judicial clarification 
on some of these issues. Still, the Act could benefit from precisely defining 
“act of terrorism” and an exact process for the Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity to determine that an incident was an act of terrorism. After all, the 
Act itself is aimed at providing certainty to security providers.154 As the 
context surrounding the SAFETY Act’s enactment shows, uncertainty pro-
vides security providers a disincentive to provide anti-terrorism 
measures—an issue the SAFETY Act attempts to resolve. 
The outcome of this litigation may also affect how willing DHS is to 
designate and certify technology and services under the SAFETY Act. If 
the Act applies to too many incidents and technologies, there is a possibil-
ity DHS may become more hesitant to designate and certify technology 
under the Act. This is significant because DHS has noted how an increase 
in the number of technologies developed may result in lower average effec-
tiveness against terrorist attacks.155 Thus, Congress should be mindful that 
over-applying the SAFETY Act to various security technologies and ser-
vices could hinder the ultimate goal of public safety. 
To that end, however, either DHS or Congress may need to address 
disparities in designation and certification for different types of industries 
 154.  Potential plaintiffs also benefit from knowing whether or not the SAFETY Act bars their 
claims completely or limits their potential recovery. 
 155.  Regulations Implementing the SAFETY Act, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,158 (June 8, 2006) (to be 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 215 Side B      06/12/2020   13:18:38
15 KRAUS MACRO 1 EIC 5.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 11:49 PM 
422 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:1 
and facilities. DHS has recognized that threats are now often directed at 
various types of public spaces.156 But hotels and casinos, while often 
crowded, are often less likely to receive SAFETY Act protections.157 One 
possible explanation for this disparity is that security at casinos is often 
aimed at theft detection instead of anti-terrorism.158 This may need to be 
addressed in DHS’s designation and certification process. It is also note-
worthy, however, that the SAFETY Act is not the only means of encourag-
ing security innovation across all public spaces and that DHS may 
incentivize different industries to do so by combining the Act’s protections 
with other initiatives. 
Still, amending the SAFETY Act to provide more clarity should not 
be an open invitation to change the Act’s core application and scope. The 
Act benefits from being limited to acts of terrorism. For instance, security 
providers may deploy qualified technologies for their intended use and 
protect against incidents similar to acts of terrorism without quite meeting 
the statutory definition.159 But the statutory language is broad enough to 
account for evolving threats while still providing clarity as to when the 
Act’s protections would apply (provided a precise process for the Secretary 
to determine when incidents are acts of terrorism). While these concerns 
are not intended to be perfect solutions, MGM’s lawsuits show how Con-
gress and DHS can resolve newly revealed issues regarding the SAFETY 
Act. 
CONCLUSION
Congress designed the SAFETY Act to encourage private companies 
to be innovative in developing security technologies and services by shield-
ing those companies from civil liability for terrorist incidents. In the wake 
of the September 11th attacks, Congress feared private companies would 
choose not to develop or provide anti-terrorism security services and prod-
ucts due to the possibility of costly liability following mass terrorist inci-
dents. MGM’s lawsuits following the Route 91 Harvest Festival incident 
highlight problems that litigants must address in lawsuits under the 
 156.  See generally Securing Soft Targets and Crowded Places, supra note 139.  
 157.  Regina Garcia Cano, Security for Stadiums, Malls Get U.S. Approval — But Not Hotels,





 158.  Id. 
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SAFETY Act. Among these issues are how the Act defines an “act of ter-
rorism” and how the Secretary of Homeland Security “determines” that an 
incident is an act of terrorism. Regardless of how courts may resolve these 
issues, MGM’s lawsuits raise new considerations for Congress to strength-
en the SAFETY Act. Primarily, there is a need to statutorily define a pre-
cise process for the Secretary of Homeland Security to determine whether 
an incident is an act of terrorism that gives notice to private security pro-
viders and potential plaintiffs. Then, relying on the SAFETY Act may truly 
be a safer bet. 
